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Abstract
Even with environmental externalities, money metric measures of individual 
welfare can often be constructed by methods similar to those of Vartia (1983), 
provided that individual’s willingness to pay functions are known. Satisfactory 
money metric measures of social welfare are harder, however. A new uniform 
money metric measure is proposed, based on the uniform poll subsidy (or tax) to 
all individuals which produces the same gain (or loss) in social welfare. Finally, 























































































































































































How large are the welfare losses caused by various forms of environmental 
degradation? This is becoming one of the pressing questions of our time. Some 
argue that the losses are not very large, and certainly too small to justify the 
kind of immensely costly measures which seem to be required if the environment 
is to be greatly improved, or even if the rate of deterioration is to be significantly 
slowed. Others argue the reverse. This paper will not settle such arguments but 
will lay out some of the principles involved in measuring such welfare losses.
In fact the problem of determining the welfare losses or gains caused by 
changes in the environment is just an instance of the general problem of mea­
suring welfare change. There are, however, two distinctions of some importance. 
First, most welfare measures in the past have been constructed on the assumption 
that consumers take prices as given, and then adjust quantities optimally in order 
to maximize their own welfare. With environmental quality, however, it is usually 
the case that consumers as individuals have little influence. Environmental qual­
ity should therefore be treated as exogenous. Fortunately, it seems easy to adapt 
standard procedures to cover this case — provided, at least, that enough is known 
about each consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for quality improvements.
There is, however, a second distinction which does make welfare measurement 
much harder. This is when the quality of the environment deteriorates so badly 
that the usual money metric measures like equivalent variation become undefined. 
A similar phenomenon was first noticed by Jones-Lee (1974, 1976) in connection 
with large increases in the probability of death. Individuals may be willing to 
part with all their possessions rather than face too large a probability of dying 
suddenly. For similar reasons, money metric measures may be ill equipped to deal 
with certain kinds of environmental catastrophe.
In addition, while it is true that the principles of constructing money metric 
measures of welfare change for individuals are gradually becoming well under­




























































































many “surplus economists” in the past have simply added up equivalent variation 
over all individuals, treating the monetary gain which a billionaire enjoys from a 
slight increase in the quality of the wine he drinks on a par with that of a young 
child from a poor family who receives life-saving medical treatment. Alternative 
measures with more reasonable welfare weights have been proposed, of course, but 
suffer from other disadvantages. For example, the “social expenditure function” 
due to Poliak (1981) — which has also been used by Jorgenson and Slesnick (1989, 
1990) and by Jorgenson (1989) —  relies upon non-local information even for small 
changes in the economic allocation. The alternative approach based on fixed wel­
fare weights which I proposed in Hammond (1984, 1988) seems neither practical 
nor easy to interpret. Accordingly, Section 3 below proposes a new measure of 
uniform equivalent variation. This is the uniform poll tax or subsidy which would 
generate the same change in social welfare. Since uniform poll subsidies or taxes 
do seem feasible (if undesirable) policy instruments, there is a sense in which this 
measure relates to an alternative policy change which could actually be carried 
out. Also, unlike the social expenditure function, for small changes the uniform 
equivalent variation will depend only on local information such as price elasticities 
of demand and relative marginal utilities of income.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 shows how to construct 
money metric measures of individual welfare and of welfare change by adapting 
the methods devised by Hausman (1981) for dealing with a single price change, 
and by Vartia (1983) for the more general case when all prices can change. Section 
3 applies similar methods to the problem of measuring social welfare and welfare 





























































































2.1. Traded and Non-traded Goods
It will be assumed that there is a finite set G of traded goods, whose prices 
the consumer takes as exogenous, and a disjoint finite set H  of non-traded goods, 
whose quantities the consumer takes as exogenous.
The traded goods will typically be ordinary physical goods which the con­
sumer is free to buy and sell on competitive markets. In the past the environment 
has usually been (imperfectly) ameliorated by means of quantitative controls on 
those activities of each individual and each firm which create pollution or other 
kinds of externalities. Many economists, however, are now recommending that 
environmental quality should be assured instead by issuing only a limited num­
ber of licences or permits to create certain types of pollution, and only in limited 
amounts. Many also recommend trying to improve the efficiency of the allocation 
of pollution rights by allowing such permits to be bought and sold on an open 
competitive market. To the extent that there are such tradeable licences to cause 
pollution, they should also be included among the set G of traded goods.
Non-traded goods in the set H , on the other hand, are intended to include 
everything whose allocation to the consumer is determined by quantitative con­
trols, or by no controls at all. Some components of H  will therefore describe 
environmental quality, others public goods, and yet others any rationing which 
the consumer faces.
Quantities of these two types of good will be denoted by the two vectors 
x € 5Rg and z £ respectively. For traded goods, including those subject 
to rationing constraints, these quantities are to be thought of as indicating net 
trades — i.e., demands minus supplies. For environmental quality levels beyond 





























































































2.2. An Ordinal Utility Function
It will also be assumed that the consumer has a well-defined and unique 
ordinal equivalence class of real-valued utility functions U(x, z). In what follows, 
U will always stand for some particular utility function of this class —  this is just a 
more precise way of saying that U is an ordinal utility function. The domain of U is 
taken to be a set F  C RG x 5ft w of individually feasible pairs (x, z). Apart from the 
usual endowment and physical feasibility constraints, F  should also allow for any 
domestic production possibilities which the consumer may be able to undertake. 
It should also embody legal constraints such as the obligation of having a pollution 
licence, etc.
For fairly obvious technical reasons, it will be assumed that both the con­
sumer’s feasible set F  and preferences over F  allow some utility representation 
U(x, z) satisfying the following standard assumptions:
(A .l) F  is a closed and convex set in 5ft G x 5RW;
(A .2) the section F x(z)  C 5R° of F  defined by F x(z )  =  ( i f  lftG | (x ,z )  £ F  } — 
i.e., the set of net trade vectors x which are individually feasible in combina­
tion with x — is bounded below in the sense that there exists some x(z) £ 5ftG 
with the property that (x ,z ) £ F  =£■ x =  x(z);
(A .3) the function U (x,z) on F  is continuously differentiable;
(A .4) as a function of the net trade vector x alone, the function U (x ,z) is strictly 
quasi-concave;
(A .5) the partial gradient vector U'x of U with respect to x is semi-positive (i.e., has 
no negative components and at least one positive component) at every point 
of F.
Note in particular that no presumption has been made regarding how U (x,z) 
changes in response to variations in z. Indeed, nothing has even been assumed 
about the signs of the various components of the partial gradient vector U'z of U 
with respect to z. After all, what one consumer regards as a beneficial change in 




























































































Of course, the ordinal equivalence class of utility functions U is assumed to 
be unknown. If it were known, then the problem of measuring “economic” welfare 
—  under the important value judgement that what the consumer prefers is indeed 
better — would already have been solved. Instead, the problem considered here is 
precisely to construct a “money-metric” ordinal representation of the preferences 
which are revealed by the consumer’s own behaviour.
2.3. Prices and Marginal Willingness to Pay
Obviously, the construction of a money-metric measure of individual welfare 
will also require the use of price data. For traded goods in the set G, it is assumed 
as usual that there is an observable exogenous price vector p G 3ft® \ {0 } of non­
negative prices which are not all zero. The corresponding income level of the 
consumer is m =  p ■ x. This must be “unearned income” from dividends and 
income transfers because all earned income from selling (traded) labour services 
or other goods is already accounted for in one or more negative terms of the sum 
P ' x =  E 9€g Psx s-
For all non-traded goods in the set H as well, it is assumed that there is 
a known price vector w G 'ftw. Here each component of w represents the 
consumer’s marginal willingness to pay to have the exogenous quantity z/, changed. 
In the case of any component h representing a form of environmental quality 
or some public good, the interpretation of Wh is clear and familiar. For any 
component h representing a rationing constraint, w/, represents the shadow price 
of relaxing the corresponding constraint. A crucial assumption which cannot be 
avoided here is that some procedure has also been devised for observing each 
consumer’s “marginal willingness to pay vector” w G ’ftw. This is a far from 
innocuous assumption, of course, but without it one would have to embark on a 
lengthy detour to discuss how to estimate w by indirect methods. Indeed, in the 
absence of any information whatsoever about w, the task of trying to estimate an 
individual’s direct welfare gains and losses from environmental change is clearly 




























































































tell whether an increase in zj, will benefit or harm the consumer. So, without 
information about w, at most those indirect gains and losses which arise because 
new policies only affect the allocation of traded goods to the consumer could be 
measured. Actually, such indirect gains and losses are often very important. They 
arise, for instance, whenever a firm is affected by a policy change. Finally, note 
that even if externality permits are traded, the observed prices can only tell us how 
much each individual is willing to pay for the right to create each such externality; 
they cannot tell us the marginal benefits from having everybody create less of the 
externality in the aggregate.
2.4. Implications of Utility Maximization
As usual, it will be assumed that the consumer chooses the endogenous net 
trade vector x £ in order to maximize the utility function U (x,z) over the 
individually feasible set F, subject to the budget constraint p ■ x <  m. Because 
of assumptions (A .l) and (A.4), the utility maximizing net vector will always be 
unique, so there is a single-valued net demand function x(p, m\ z) whose arguments 
include the exogenous quantity vector z, along with the usual price vector p and 
income level m. Let v(p, m; z) :=  U(x(p,m; z), z) denote the consumer’s indirect 
utility function. Obviously
Given our assumptions, the indirect utility function v(p, m; z) will be differ­
entiable as a function of p and m together, except perhaps when x(p, m; z) is on 
the boundary of the conditionally feasible set F jf(z). At least it will always be 
continuous as a function of m alone. The consumer’s marginal utility of income
assumption (A .5), this must be positive. The well known Roy’s identity can then 
be expressed in the form
x(p, m; z) — arg 
v(p, m; z) =
( 1)
A(p, m ;z) is defined in the usual way as -^v(jp,m\ z) or i:’Jt(p. rn\ z). Because of




























































































where v'p(p, m\ z) denotes the partial gradient vector of v with respect to p.
On the other hand w, the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for changes 
in the exogenous quantity vector z, must be a function w(p, m; z) satisfying
«i(p , *) =  u 'z(x(p . m; z) . z) =  a(p . m>z ) w(p . z )- (3)
2.5. The Money Metric Utility Function
In order to construct money metric measures of welfare and of welfare change, 
it will be necessary to keep fixed both a reference price vector pR € SJ® and a 
reference exogenous quantity vector z R 6 Hfl . Then the money metric direct 
utility function <f>(x,z) is defined implicitly as the solution to the equation
v(pR,<t>(x,z)\zR) - U ( x , z ) .  (4)
In other words, 4>{x, z) is the level of unearned income which, if made available to 
the consumer when facing the reference price vector pR and the reference exogenous 
quantity vector z R, and if spent optimally on an appropriate utility maximizing 
net trade vector, would make the consumer just as well off as at (x, z). Although 
pR and z R are really additional arguments of the function <f>(x,z), they will be 
suppressed because they should always be held constant when constructing any 
money metric measure of welfare. Note that, because the marginal utility of 
income A(pR,</>(x, z); z R) is always positive, <f>(x, z) does increase strictly as U(x, z) 
increases.
The money metric indirect utility function </’(p, to; z) is defined similarly as 
the solution to the equation
v(pR,il>(p,m-,z)\zR) =  v(p ,m ;z). (5)
It has the property that ip(p,m-,z) =  max, {</>(x,z) \ x 6 F\p ■ x <  to} because 
of (1) above.
When the exogenous variables (p, z) assume their reference values (pR, z R), it 




























































































becomes equal to actual unearned income. This shows, moreover, the money 
metric utility function has been constructed so that the marginal utility of income 
for the reference exogenous price and quantity vector is always equal to one.1
2.6. The Compensating, Equivalent, and General Variation
Measures of welfare change are concerned with the effect on the consumer 
of a change in exogenous variables. To this end, consider a change which takes 
the exogenous variables (p, m, z) from their initial values (p °,m °,z° ) to some new 
final values (p , m , z1). Given the particular reference price and quantity vectors 
(pR,z R), a corresponding measure of welfare change is the general variation
V>(p\m1;z 1)-V > (p°,m 0;z0) (6)
in money metric utility.
Two particular measures of variation have received much attention in the 
literature, following Hicks (1939, 1940, 1981). The first is the compensating vari­
ation. This arises when (pR,z R) =  (p1, z1), so the final values of the exoge­
nous prices and quantities are taken as reference values. Then (5) implies that 
t/>(p*, m1; z1) =  V’(pRi™ }; zR) =  m1, and so the measure of welfare change (6) 
becomes CV :=  m1 — V>(p°,m°;z°). Since (5) also implies that t/>(p°,m°;z0) =  
m1 — CV must satisfy v(pl ,m 1 — CV; z1) =  o(p °,m °;z0), the measure CV repre­
sents the total amount which the consumer is willing to pay to make the move from 
(p°,m °,z°) to (p1,m 1,z 1). Given a fixed final situation (p ^ m ^ z1), this measure 
of compensating variation increases as the status quo (p °,m °,z0) becomes worse. 
Nothing can be said, however, about whether it increases or decreases as the 
(probably more interesting) final situation changes.
The second particular measure is the equivalent variation, which arises when 
(pR,z R) =  (p°,z°), so the initial values of the exogenous prices and quantities
1 It is usual, o f  course, to define money metric utility in terms o f  the expenditure function. 
This approach is usually equivalent to that adopted above, but may be inaccurate when utility 
maximizing demands lie on the boundary o f  the feasible set. This, and also the closer parallels 
with what follows later when I discuss money metric social welfare measures, are my reasons for 




























































































are taken as reference values. Then t/i(p0,m °; z°) =  i!>(pR,m a-,zR) =  m° because 
of (5). So the measure of welfare change (6) becomes EV :=  '(/’(p1 > m 1; z 1) — m°. 
In contrast to the compensating variation, the equivalent variation is higher for 
better changes from an existing status quo, so can itself be used as a welfare 
indicator. Since (5) implies that V '(p m 1; z1) =  m °+E V must satisfy the equation 
v(p°,m ° +  E V ;z°) =  »(p1,m 1;z 1), the measure EV represents the total amount 
which the consumer is willing to be paid in order not to make the move from 
(p°, m°, z°) to (pS m ’ .z 1).
2.7. Small Changes
The problem to be considered next is how to calculate such measures of vari­
ation when the indirect utility function is not known. It will be assumed that 
one knows instead only the vector demand function x(p, m ;z) for those goods 
whose prices are exogenous and whose quantities are endogenous, as well as the 
vector willingness to pay function w{p, m; z) for those goods whose quantities are 
exogenous and whose prices are endogenous.
The effect of a small change upon the money metric measure of individual 
welfare can be found by taking the total differential of (5), which is
v'm(pR> fKP. m< *); z R)di/> =  dp- v'p(p, to; z) +  v'm(p, m; z) dm +  v'z (p, m; z) • dz 
=  v'm(p ,m ;z) [dm -  dp ■ x(p,m ; z) +  w(p,m\ z) ■ dz],
(7)
where the second equation follows from Roy’s identity. So
d4, =  ^ ( p ^ m ' i z " )  [dm +  “>(P,"b*)dz}. (8)
In the special case when (p, z) is the reference point (pR,z R) and so i/>(p, m ;z) 
becomes equal to to, this reduces to the familiar form




























































































2.8. A  Path Differential Equation
In order to be able to compute the effect of any larger change, it is obviously 
sufficient to know how to find the money metric measure of utility >/>(p, m; z) for 
any point (p, m, z), and with respect to an arbitrary reference point (pR,z R). 
To this end, let (p (f),z(t)) (0 <  t <  1) be any continuously differentiable path, 
parametrized by the real variable t, whose endpoints are respectively (p(0), 2(0)) =  
(p, z) and (p (l) ,z ( l) )  =  (pR, zR). For example, one could take the line segment 
joining (p, z) to (pR, zR), with p(t) =  p +  t (pR — p) and z(<) =  z +  t (zR — z). But 
other paths could be much more convenient instead. Note that the chosen path 
starts at (p, z), the target point where the money metric is to be evaluated, and 
then comes back to the reference point (pR,z R).
Along such a path, we will now construct an income compensation function 
m(i) with the property that
v(p(t),m(ty,z(t)) =  v(p,m;z) (10)
whenever 0 <  t <  1. In other words, the path (p (t),m (t),z (t)) (0 < t <  1) will 
be part of one of the consumer’s indifference curves — or, more exactly, a level 
surface of the indirect utility function. Obviously m(0) ~  m when t — 0. At the 
other end of the path, when t =  1 and so (p(f),z(<)) =  (pR,z R), one will have 
v(pR,m (l); z R) =  v(p,m ;z). This implies that m (l) =  m ;z), and so m (l) is
the required money metric measure of utility.
The construction of m(t) requires solving an ordinary differential equation. 
For differentiating (10) totally with respect to t gives
0 =  m(4); z(4)) =  P ■ V'P +  v'm m +  v'z ■ z
d t ( 11)
=  A [ -p  • x(p, m; z) +  m +  w(p, m; z) • i],
where, of course, p, m and z denote derivatives with respect to t. Since (A.5) 
implies that A is always positive, (11) reduces to the ordinary differential equation




























































































in m(<), with initial condition m(0) =  m, of course.
2.9. Integrability and Path Independence
Suppose that the demand and willingness to pay functions are derived from 
preferences satisfying assumptions (A.1-A.5) above. Then equation (12) must 
give a unique solution for m (l) which is independent of how the path (p(<), z(<)) 
(0 <  f < 1) from (p, z) to (pR, z R) is chosen. In fact, the only possible solution for 
m (l) is precisely the desired money metric utility level »/>(p, m; z).
It is more interesting, however, to know what conditions the demand and 
willingness to pay functions x(p, m ;z) and w (p,m ;z) must satisfy in order to 
ensure that they do correspond to a preference ordering for the consumer. As is 
well known, the net demand function x(p, m; z) should satisfy the budget condition 
(B) that p - x(p, m ;z) =  m. In addition, both functions i(p ,m ;z ) and w (p,m ;z) 
should be homogeneous of degree zero as p and m vary together, in the sense that
x(a  p ,am ; z) =  x(p,m ; z); w (a p ,a m ;z ) — w (p,m ;z) (H )
for every positive scalar a. The other condition that is usually invoked, in order to 
ensure that the differential equation (12) does have a solution, is a form of Lipschitz 
condition. This requires the income derivatives x'm(p,m ; z) and w'm(p,m; z) to 
be bounded on any path along which one wants to solve (12). This will be true 
automatically whenever these income derivatives are actually continuous functions 
of (p, m, z).
Of rather more interest are the appropriate versions of the familiar conditions 
requiring the Slutsky matrix to be both symmetric and negative semi-definite. To 
investigate this, notice first how (12) will have a unique and path independent 
solution for m(t) along any path from (p, z) to the reference point (pR,z R), with 
the initial condition m(0) =  m always being satisfied, if and only if there exists 
a general income compensation function m(p,z) which satisfies the more general 
version




























































































of (10). The usual integrability condition is that any possible solution to (13) 




of second order partial derivatives. But differentiating (13) partially with respect 
to the components of p and of z gives:
v'p(p, m(P, z); z) +  v'm(p, m(p, 2); 2) m'p(p, z) =  0; 
” Up > ™(P. z); z) + v'm(p, m(p, 2); 2) m'z(p, 2) =  0.
Using Roy’s identity (2) and also (3) once again then implies that
(15)
mr(p. z) =  *(P, ™(p, z); z); m'z(p, 2) =  —w(p, m(p, 2); 2). (16)
In fact, these are really just familiar envelope results for compensated demand and 
willingness to pay functions. Differentiating (16) partially once more leads to the 
following equation for the partitioned Hessian matrix (14)
S 'O \ - 1
(  x'p +  x'mx T x'z
m'zp m"z ) 1 “  1K-w'p -w 'mx T - w ‘
(17)
where T denotes the transpose of a matrix. The convention that w, x, w'm and 
x'm are all column vectors has also been used. In terms of explicit second order 
partial derivatives, (17) can be written as
\ d2m 1 \ ^  l
K » » i v Jm .€g
1 r a2m


















+ dwh ] h.h', '£H
(18)
where all the partial derivatives of the generalized income compensation function 
m are evaluated at (p, 2), and all those of the demand and willingness to pay




























































































The upper left hand comer is the familiar Slutsky matrix. Utility maximiza­
tion implies that this must not only be symmetric, but also negative semi-definite. 
All the rest of the matrix must be symmetric as well, though not necessarily nega­
tive semi-definite because no optimization with respect to either w or z is involved. 
This completes the specification of the relevant integrability conditions which are 
sufficient to ensure that the demand and willingness to pay functions do correspond 
to the solution of a utility maximization problem on the part of the consumer.
2.10. Individual Catastrophes
So far I have neglected one last important question. This is when the money 
metric utility function is well defined and when it is not. Recall how (5) defines 
ip(p, m; z) as the (unique) value of y which solves the equation
v{pR,y ;z R) =  v(p ,m ;z) (19)
— assuming that such a y exists. Now, in the case when all goods can be traded 
at exogenous prices and there are no exogenous quantities, (19) reduces to
v(pR,y )  =  v{p,m). (20)
In this case it has been customary to assume that the consumer’s consumption 
set is the non-negative orthant 3?+, and that there is a fixed endowment vector e. 
In this special case, the set F  of feasible net trades becomes equal to the vector 
difference — {e}. So the indirect utility function is well defined for whenever 
m >  —p ■ e, and achieves a fixed minimum value of v :=  v(p, —p • e) =  U (—e), 
no matter what p may be. Then, however, v(pR,y ) =  v when y =  —p R ■ e. And 
v(pR,y ) >  v(p, m) whenever y >  pR ■ x(p,m ) because a consumer who is faced 
with prices pR and income y cannot be forced to do worse than have the net trade 
vector x(p,m ). Because the function v(pR,y) is continuous in y, its range must 
then include all the closed interval [u, v(pR,pR ■ x(p, m )] of the real fine. So the 
point v(p,m ) in particular must lie in the range of v(pR,y ), implying that (20) 




























































































I shall now consider the more general case which occurs when some quantities 
may be exogenous to the consumer, or because the feasible set does not have the 
very special form F  =  — {e } . To this end, define
m R :=  min { pR • x | (x, zR) E F  } (21)
X
as the minimum income level consistent with individual feasibility when the ex­
ogenous price and quantity vectors are at their reference levels. Let
vR := v (p R,m R\zR) (22)
denote the corresponding minimum utility vector. Also, let
vR :=  sup { v(pR,m; zR) } (23)
m
be the corresponding supremum utility level, whose value could be +oo. Then it is 
obvious that (19) has a well defined solution V’(p>m>2) for all situations (p ,m ,z ) 
which satisfy the inequalities vR < v(p, m; z) < vR. Outside this interval, however, 
money metric utility will not be well-defined for the particular reference price and 
quantity vectors (pR,z R).
Consider first the case when the situation ip. m ,z) is so bad that v(p, rn; z) <  
vR. Then, in the reference situation (pR,z R), there is no unearned income level 
low enough to make the consumer as badly off as at (p ,m ;z) while still allowing 
individual feasibility. Some penalty other than a reduction in unearned income is 
required if utility is to be reduced this much. Compared to the reference situa­
tion, (p ,m ,z ) is an “individual catastrophe,” in effect. No finite negative number 
y is small enough to solve (19). No matter how much wealth rnR he has in the 
situation (pR,m R,z R), the consumer would strictly prefer to give up all of it in 
order to avoid the change from (pR,m R,z R) to (p ,m ,z ). This could be because 
the change in the exogenous quantity variables from zR to z constitutes some kind 
of personal disaster — for example, a sufficiently large increase in the probability 




























































































from some kind of environmental catastrophe. Even without any exogenous quan­
tity variables, however, the simpler equation (20) will still fail to have a solution if 
minimum subsistence at prices pR is sufficiently better for the consumer than min­
imum subsistence at prices p, and if income m is sufficiently close to subsistence. 
Nevertheless, this possibility is certainly less plausible.
On the other hand, suppose the situation (p, to, z) is so good that v(p, m ;z )>  
vR. Then, in the reference situation, no (finite) unearned income level is high 
enough to make the consumer as well off as at (p, m ,z). Indeed, if u(p, to; z) >  vr , 
then not even y =  +oo would be high enough, but some non-monetary reward 
would be required. If, for example, (p, m, z) is a situation in the past when the 
consumer enjoyed normal health and reasonable prosperity, whereas the reference 
situation (pR,m R, z R) is one in which a personal disaster has already occurred, it 
is possible that no amount of money is ever enough to restore the consumer to his 
former level of well-being, and so compensate for the disastrous change from z to 
z R.
What these possibilities illustrate is that money metrics are at best incom­
plete measures of welfare and of welfare change. Some alterations in individual 
circumstances can be so drastic that no finite sum of money can ever compensate, 
in which case the money metric is undefined. Applied economists should always 
take account of this possibility.
3. Social Welfare and Uniform Variation
3.1. Additive Money Metric Utility
This and succeeding sections will consider a finite set I  of individuals indi­
cated by subscripts i. Boldface letters will denote profiles of vectors, one for each 
individual in society. For instance, z will denote the entire list (z,-),e /  of all the 
different exogenous quantity vectors z; faced by all the different individuals in so­
ciety, i G I. Similarly, m will denote the personal distribution of income in society, 
{m ,)j£/. The problem then is to know how to construct appropriate money metric 




























































































One such approach that has been used too much in the past is simply to add up 
all the different individuals’ measures of money metric utility —  i.e., one considers 
the sum M(p, m; z) =  Yliei V;i(p, mH Zi). The reference situation (pR, z R) involves 
a combination of an exogenous price vector with specified levels of the exogenous 
quantitiy vector for each individual separately. Note the assumption that the 
exogenous price vector p is the same for all individuals, as it will be if the economy 
has perfectly competitive markets for traded goods. Note too that in the reference 
situation itself, this additive money metric measure becomes A/(p , m; z'^) =  
'l>i(pR>mi‘, z!i) =  Yliel m>> or j ust the total level of all unearned income, 
without any regard whatsoever for its distribution. This complete neglect of any 
concern for distributive justice explains why this measure has so little ethical 
appeal.
3.2. Social Welfare Functions
In order to go beyond crude measures like additive money metric utility, some 
more sophisticated value judgements and interpersonal comparisons of utility are 
required. Thus it will be assumed that there exists some direct social welfare 
function of the Paretian form
W (x, z) ee Q((Ui{xi, zi)}.'e/) , (24)
where Cl is a strictly increasing function of the vector z;)),'6/  of all the dif­
ferent individual utility levels. The corresponding indirect social welfare function, 
of course, must be




























































































3.3. Total Money Metric Utility
To allow these rather more sophisticated ethical values, Jorgenson and Slesnick 
(1989, 1990) and Jorgenson (1989) have used an alternative method of money met­
ric social welfare measurement. This is based on the idea behind Poliak’s (1981) 
approach to constructing social cost of living indices. The method involves con­
sidering the total money income which, if distributed optimally, would yield the 
same level of social welfare. To define it formally, first let the indirect social welfare 
function of total income be given by
V*(p, M ;z ) :=  max { V(p, m ;z) | mi <  M  }. (26)
Thus U*(p, M ;z) represents the maximum level of social welfare that can be 
achieved by distributing the total income M  optimally among all individuals in 
society. Note that V*(p, M\ z) must always be an increasing function of M  because 
each individual’s marginal utility of income A,(pfi, m;; z R) is always positive.
As in the case of single individuals, in order to construct money metric 
measures of social welfare and of social welfare change, a reference price vec­
tor p R 6 and a reference exogenous interpersonal profile of quantity vectors 
*R =  )iei e  must both be kept fixed. Then the total money metric direct 
utility function $(x, z) is defined implicitly as the solution to the equation
V ( p R,$ {x ,z y iz) =  W(x., z). (27)
In other words, 4>(x, z) is the level of total unearned income which, if available for 
distribution between all consumers when society faces the reference price vector pR 
and the reference exogenous profile of quantity vectors zR, and if distributed and 
then spent optimally on appropriate social welfare maximizing net trade vectors, 
would make society as a whole just as well off as at (x, z). Note that <k(x, z) does 
increase strictly as W (x, z) increases because, as shown in the previous paragraph, 




























































































The total money metric indirect utility function ^(p, m ;z) is defined similarly 
as the solution to the equation
V '{p R, *(p , m; z); •*) =  V(p, m; z). (28)
In the special case when the exogenous variables (p, z) happen to assume their 
reference values (pR, zR), it must be true that 'i(p ri, m; z !t) becomes equal to the 
optimally distributed equivalent income —  i.e., that level of total income which, if 
distributed optimally between the different individuals of society, would produce 
the same level of social welfare. The equivalent income 'f(p R, m; z R) is only equal 
to Yliel m> when m happens to be an optimal distribution given (pR,z R). Gen­
erally, of course, >&(pR, m; z R) is less than Yliei m>> an(l the difference between 
the two is a total income measure of the social welfare loss due to distributive 
injustice. Of special note is the case considered by Atkinson (1970), in which an 
equal distribution of income is always optimal. Then 'k(pR, m; z R) becomes none 
other than what Atkinson called the equally distributed equivalent income, and 
S i e /  m‘ — m; z R) becomes an income measure of the social welfare loss due
to inequality.
Though such measures do accurately reflect the social welfare function, they 
will often be rather inconvenient and also hard to interpret. Suppose, for instance, 
that a policy change results in the economy moving from the original situation 
s° :=  (p°, m°; z°) —  which is a combination of a price vector for traded goods, an 
unearned income distribution, and profile of exogenous quantity vectors —  to the 
new situation s1 :=  (p1, m 1; z1). Suppose too that this change increases the above 
money metric measure of social welfare by precisely 100 ecus per head in a society 
whose population numbers 50 million. This means that the policy change has 
exactly the same welfare effect as the combination of the following three changes:
(i) with p° and z° both fixed, the total income M° := JT g; m°t which is available 
in the original situation s° is reduced to the optimally distributed income 




























































































of (first-best) lump-sum transfers in order to achieve a new distribution of 
income which generates exactly the same level of welfare as s° ;
(ii) additional income A M  whose total is 5 billion ecus —  equivalent to 100 ecus 
per head —  is made available in order to bring the new total up to M ° +  A M ;
(iii) with p1 and z1 both fixed, the new total income M ° +  A M  is redistributed 
optimally by means of lump-sum transfers, and the result must be a new 
distribution of income which generates exactly the same level of welfare as s1.
Thus changes in social welfare are always calculated with reference to first-best 
optimal distributions of income. These are likely to be far from existing distribu­
tions, and also unattainable in practice —  e.g., because of incentive constraints 
such as those considered in Hammond (1979, 1987) and Roberts (1984). Thus the 
figure of 100 ecus per head may be rather misleading, since it might be thought to 
indicate that the welfare effect is the same as if each individual received an extra 
100 ecus in the original situation s°, instead of in the welfare equivalent situa­
tion which only arises when total income has first been reduced to M ° and then 
optimally redistributed. Finally, the need to calculate the optimally distributed 
equivalent in each case is likely to be a major inconvenience. For one thing, even if 
the change from s° to s1 is quite small, the two transitions from s° to the welfare 
equivalent situation with an optimal income distribution, and then from a different 
optimal income distribution back to s1, are both likely to be large and difficult 
to calculate with much precision. For all these reasons the “uniform variation” 
measures to be presented below seem definitely more helpful.
3.4. The Uniform Money Metric Measure of Social Welfare
In order to construct the uniform money metric measures of social welfare 
and of social welfare change to be proposed here, not only must both some refer­
ence price vector pK £ and some reference exogenous interpersonal profile of 
quantity vectors zR =  (zR);6/  £ %tHI be kept fixed throughout; so also must a 
reference distribution m R =  (m f) ;6/  £ 37 f of unearned incomes. The new mea­




























































































all individuals in the reference situation (pR, mR,z R), would yield the same level 
of social welfare.
Since direct money metric measures play no role in the rest of this paper, 
only the indirect uniform money metric social welfare function m; z) will be 
defined. Formally, it is the (unique) solution to the equation
V(pR, m R +  p(p, m; z) 1; z R) =  V(p, m; z), (29)
where 1 denotes the vector in each of whose components is equal to 1. Note 
once again how p(p, m; z) must increase whenever V(p. m; z) does.
In the special case when all the exogenous variables (p, m, z) happen to as­
sume their reference values (pR, m R, z R), then p(pR, m R; z R) reduces to zero. But 
when only the variables (p ,z) are at their reference values (pR,z R), whereas the 
income distribution m has departed from its reference value m R to m R I rj 1 be­
cause of some uniform net poll subsidy of size a, it must be true, of course, that 
p(pR,m ;z R) =  a.
3.5. Uniform Variation
Consider a change in the exogenous variables (p, m, z) from initial values 
(p ° ,m °,z0) to final values (p1, m 1, z1). Given the particular reference prices, in­
comes and exogenous quantity vectors (pR,m R,z R), a corresponding measure of 
welfare change is the uniform variation
Mp1, 11,1; z1) — p(p°, m°; z°) (30)
in uniform money metric social welfare.
As in the case of the money metric measure of variation for a single individual, 
two particular cases are worth especial attention. The first concerns the uniform 
compensating variation (or UCV), which arises when (pR, m R,z R) =  (p1,m 1,z 1), 
so that the final values of the exogenous prices, incomes, and quantities are taken 




























































































of welfare change (30) becomes —p(p°, m °;z°). Thus UCV must represent the 
total amount which society is willing to pay, in the form of a uniform poll tax 
on all individuals, in order to be allowed to make the move from (p°, m °, z °) to 
(p 'j in 'jZ 1). As with the measure of compensating variation for a single individ­
ual, for any given fixed final situation (p ^ m 'jZ 1), this social measure of uniform 
compensating variation increases as the status quo (p ° ,m °;z0) becomes worse.
The second particular case concerns the uniform equivalent variation (or 
UEV), which arises when (pR, m,!, z R) =  (p°, m°, z°), so that the initial values of 
the exogenous prices, incomes, and quantities are taken as reference values. Then 
p (p °,m °;z°) =  p(p , m R: z R) =  0, and so the measure of welfare change (30) 
reduces to p(p*, m 1; z1). In contrast to the uniform compensating variation, the 
uniform equivalent variation is higher for better changes from an existing status 
quo. Obviously UEV is itself a welfare indicator. In fact UEV must represent the 
total amount which the society is willing to be receive, in the form of a uniform 
poll subsidy on all individuals, in order to avoid making the move from (p°, m°, z°) 
to (p1, m 1, z1).
3.6. Small Changes
Having defined uniform equivalent variation and related measures of social 
welfare change, it is important to know how to calculate them when neither in­
dividuals’ indirect utility functions nor the indirect social welfare function are 
known. Instead it is assumed that only individuals’ vector demand functions 
Xi(p,m-i; Zi) (i 6 I)  for those goods with exogenous prices and endogenous quan­
tities are known, as well as the vector willingness to pay functions u>j(p, m,; 2;) 
(* 6 I)  for those goods with exogenous quantities and endogenous prices. Obvi­
ously, some information about the relative marginal utilities of income for different 
individuals will also be necessary. Accordingly, let /?,(p, m; z) denote the partial 
derivative VJ,,(p, m ;z ) :=  ■^^■(p, m ;z), which is just the marginal social welfare 
of individual i’s income. This, of course, cannot be observed, since it is not even 




























































































V (p , m, z) is chosen which represents the same ethical preferences. It will be as­
sumed, however, that all the marginal rates of substitution Pi(p, m, z ) //?;* (p, m, z) 
between the income levels of different pairs of individuals i and i' are known and 
are mutually consistent. This is then sufficient information to determine the nor­
malized marginal social welfare
Oi{p, m; z) :=  • Pi(p, m ; z ) (31)
E ieiPj iP,  m ; z )
of each individual i ’s income. It is these ratios which will appear in the formulae 
to be derived below.
To find the effect of a small change upon the uniform money metric measure 
of social welfare, take the total differential of (29) while holding the reference 
situation (pR, m R,z R) fixed. Using Roy’s identity (2) and also (3), the result is
y \ c . Pi(pR,m R +  p (p ,m -,z )l ;zR) dp
I T  (32)
=  2 ^  Pi(p, m; z) [drrti -  dp ■ x;(p,m ,; Zi) +  tr,(p, m,; z,) - dzt] .
In the special case when (p,m , z) is the reference situation (pR,m R,z R) and so 
p(p, m, z) =  0, (31) implies that (32) reduces to the familiar form
dp =  m; z) [dm; — dp ■ x;(p, m,-; Zi) +  u>;(p,m;; Zi) ■ dzi]. (33)
For comparison purposes, it is instructive to consider how the total money 
metric indirect utility function \l/(p, m; z) of Section 3.3 responds to small changes. 
The relevant total differential of (28) is
d V ( PR^ ( p , m -zy ,zR) =  v^d<b
=  dV (p, m; z) =  Pi(p, m ;z) [dim -  dp ■ Xi(p,mr,Zi) +  toj(p,mj;z,-) • dzf].
(34)
From this it follows that
_  E .g i Pi(p,m \z ) [dmi -  dp ■ Xj(p,mj; Zi) +  Wj(p, m,; Zj) ■ dzj]
Vm (p R, * ( p ,™-,zY,*R) (3 5 )





























































































E j g/ ^ ( p . m ; g)
vM(pR>*(p>m ; z ) ;zR) '
Even in the special case when (p, z) is the reference situation (pfl 
not generally reduce to (33) but maintains an extra factor
, zR), (35) does
(36)
ir E j e l  Pj(PR’ m '’ * R)
' V%'(p« tf(p K ,m ;z* );z « ) ’
(37)
The numerator of (37) is the marginal social welfare from giving each individual 
one unit of extra income in the situation (pfl, m, z fl), where the income distribution 
may be far from optimal. The denominator is the marginal social welfare of extra 
total income when income is being distributed optimally. Generally, 8R £  1, and 
in fact 0R is quite awkward to calculate.
3.7. A Path Differential Equation
As in the case of individual money metric measures of utility, it will be suf­
ficient to know how to find the uniform money metric measure of social welfare 
p(p, m; z) for any point (p, m, z), and with respect to an arbitrary reference point 
(pR,m R,z R). So let (p(i), m(t),z(<)) (0 < t <  1) be any continuously differen­
tiable path, parametrized by the real variable t , whose two endpoints are respec­
tively (p(0), m (0),z(0)) =  (p ,m ,z) and (p ( l ) ,m ( l ) ,z ( l ) )  =  (pR,m R, z R). For 
example, one could take the line segment joining (p, m, z) to (pR, m R, z H), which 
hasp(f) =  p-ft (pR—p) and, for each individual i € I, bothmi(<) =- m;-f< (mR—rhi) 
and Zi(t) =  zi +  t (zR — Zj). But other paths are equally valid and coidd be chosen 
instead if they happen to be easier to work with.
A uniform income compensation function p(<) (0 <  t <  1) will now be con­
structed in order to satisfy the equation
V(p(<), m(t) + p(t) 1; z(f)) =  V(p, m; z) (38)
all along such a path. Then, when t — 0 and so (p(0), m(0); z(0)) =  (p, m ,z), it 




























































































one will have V(pR,m R +  p ( l ) l ; z R) =  V (p, m, z). This implies that p (l)  is the 
required uniform money metric measure of social welfare.
As with the individual money compensation function of Section 2.8, the con­
struction here will also involve solving an ordinary differential equation. Note first 
how, because of the Paretian form of the indirect social welfare function (25), and 
because both Roy’s identity (2) and (3) axe satisfied by each individual’s indirect 
utility and demand functions, it must be true that the partial gradient vectors of 
V  with respect to the price vector and with respect to each individual’s quantity 
vector will satisfy
Vp(p ,m \*) =  - £ . g / P*(P’
vz;(p < m; z) =  ft(p.m; z) m>\ 20-
Then, differentiating (38) totally with respect to t shows that
(39)
£ i6/ Pi(t) [mj(f) +  £(<) -  p(<) • xi(t) +  W i ( t )  ■ i,(t)J =  0 (40)
where, of course, p, m, and i, all denote derivatives with respect to t. Also, 
/3,(f) has been written as an abbreviation for 0i(p(t),m(t) -f- p(t) 1; z(<))), Xi(<) 
for Xi(p(t),mi(t) +  p(<);z;(f)), and Wi(t) for uq(p(t),m ,(f) -)- p (f);z j(f)). Since 
Yliel Pi(?) is always positive under the assumptions made above, and using the 
definition of uj, in (31) as the normalized marginal social welfare of individual i ’s 
income, this equation then reduces to the ordinary differential equation
M =  £  7 Wi [p • Xi(p, mi +  p\ z,) -  rhi -  Wj(p, mi +  p; zt) ■ z,] (41)
in the single variable p(<), where all the time arguments have been suppressed. 




























































































3.8. Integrability and Path Independence
As in the case of the individual money metric measure of utility, notice that, 
whenever the demand and willingness to pay functions are derived from preferences 
satisfying assumptions (A.1-A.5) above, and the normalized welfare weights lo, 
are derived from an explicit social welfare function, this differential equation must 
have a unique solution for //(1} which is independent of how the continuous path 
(p(f), m(t), z(<)) (0 < t <  1) from (p, m ,z) to (p ^ m ^ z ^ )  is chosen —  namely, 
the only possible solution for p (l)  must be the desired uniform money metric 
measure of social welfare p(p, m; z).
It is more interesting, however, as was the case with individual measures of 
welfare, to know what conditions the demand functions r  ,(p, mt; 2j), willingness to 
pay functions uq(p, m;; 2j), and normalized marginal utility functions o>,(p, m; z) 
must jointly satisfy in order to ensure that they do all correspond to preference 
orderings for each consumer which are then aggregated by means of some Paretian 
social welfare ordering. Obviously, we shall have to insist on the conditions of 
Section 2.9 under which individual preference orderings exist. Thus, our concern 
here is really just with the extra conditions which must be imposed upon the 
functions Wi(p, nr; z).
The argument which will be used here differs from that in Section 2.9 for 
the case of a single individual because, whereas the functions n (p , m,; 2*) and 
u>i(p, mi] Zi) describe the utility-maximing behaviour and willingness to pay of 
consumer i, the functions w,(p, m; z) represent the value judgements of whoever is 
constructing the social welfare measures. However, as with the earlier individual 
money metric, in order that (41) can be solved uniquely for p(t) along any path 
from (p, m, z) to the reference point (pR, m R. z R), with the initial condition p(0) =  
0 always being satisfied, there must be a general income compensation function 
p(p, m; z) which satisfies the more general version
P (p ,m  +  p (p ,m ;z ) l ;z )  =  P (p ,m ;z ) (42)




























































































metric utility function ipi(p,mi\ Z j ) ;  zR) satisfying a version of (5) appropriate to 
each individual i 6 I, namely
*'.(pR, ’/’.(p,mi;zi);2f )  s  «i(p,mi|Zi)- (43)
Then, because the indirect social welfare function has a Paretian form (25), there 
must exist some stricly increasing function 0* defined on with the property 
that
V (p ,m ;z) =  n m((ipi(p,m i;zi))ieI). (44)
The obvious condition to be imposed now is that the normalized marginal utility 
functions u>i(p, m; z) can be derived from such an explicit social welfare function. 





je i  dipj dmj
(45)
This is the required condition on the welfare weights o>,(p, m; z) which ensures 
both integrability and path independence of any possible solution to (42).
3.9. Social Catastrophes
As with the individual measures of money metric utility, it is important to 
consider also when the uniform money metric social welfare function is well defined. 
To this end, define
m f :=  min { pR ■ x \ (x, z f ) e  F, } (46)
as individual i's minimum income level consistent with physical feasibility for him 
alone when the exogenous price and quantity vectors are at their reference levels. 
Then let
r :=  max { m "  — m.R ) ig/ 1 1  —1 J (47)
be the maximum uniform poll tax which can be levied in the reference situation 
(pR,m R,z R) without forcing anybody outside their physically feasible set. Also, 
let




























































































be the corresponding minimum level of social welfare which can be achieved by 
making the poll tax as large as possible. Finally, let
V R :=sup {V (p R,m fi +  p l ; z R) }  (49)
b
be the corresponding supremum level of social welfare from an indefinitely large 
uniform poll subsidy. The value of V R, of course, could be +oo. Then, as in the 
similar case of individual money metric utility considered in the previous section, 
it is obvious that the measure p(p, m; z) of uniform money metric social welfare 
is well defined for all (p, m, z) satisfying V R <  V(p, m; z) <  V R, but not outside 
this range.
When V(p, m; z) <  the situation (p, m; z) is so bad that some individ­
uals cannot afford to pay the uniform poll tax which would be needed to reduce 
social welfare this much. This is a “social catastrophe,” in effect. But even so 
one could still have t>j(p, m,-; z,) slightly larger than vR :=  Vi(pR, m R; zR) for all 
individuals i 6 J, implying that a social catastrophe need not be any person’s 
individual catastrophe. For suppose that m f is very much larger than m f for a 
large proportion of individuals who are accordingly somewhat rich, yet mR is only 
very slightly larger than m R for the others who are accordingly rather poor. Then, 
if social welfare has to be reduced by means of a uniform poll tax, there can easily 
be a limit to how low social welfare can fall because of the limit on how much poll 
tax the poorer individuals can be forced to pay. In this sense, social catastrophes 
can arise purely because the distribution of income implies very unequal abilities 
to pay taxes.
The other problematic case occurs when the situation (p, m; z) is so good that 
V(p, m ;z) >  V R >  V(pR, m R +  p l ; z R) for all finite scalars p, no matter how 
large. Because of the Paretian form of the social welfare function, this can only 
occur if there exists at least one individual i 6 I  for whom v,(p, m,; zt) > vR := 
supm Vi(pR, m; zR). The corresponding possibility for individuals was discussed in 




























































































4. Conclusions and Remaining Problems
4.1. Summ ary
Methods of constructing money metric measures of individual and social wel­
fare have been presented. They work even when some important aspects of the 
environment are subject to change, though with a few important exceptions which 
can arise in connection with “catastrophes” for which the willingness to pay to 
avoid them is too large to be properly defined. For individual welfare, the stan­
dard money metric was extended in a rather obvious way to deal with exogenous 
quantity (or environmental quality) variables which affect well-being. In the case 
of social welfare, however, a new “uniform money metric” was eventually pro­
posed. This is based on the amount of a uniform poll tax or subsidy which would 
produce an equivalent effect on the well-being of society as a whole, according to 
some specific social welfare function which respects individuals’ preferences.
4.2. A lternatives to  U niform  Poll Taxes and Subsidies
Much of the existing literature concerned with money metric measures of 
social welfare relies on comparing existing situations with what would be possible 
in the presence of optimal lump-sum transfers. This makes the measures hard to 
interpret, since they relate to monetary gains which could only be realized through 
policies which, because of incentive compatibility problems, are probably totally 
impractical. As an alternative, uniform poll taxes and subsidies are certainly much 
more realistic instruments of policy. The money metric measures which are based 
upon them therefore have the merit of giving us some idea of how large a welfare 
gain is really possible with a policy that could just possibly be carried out in 
practice. Yet uniform poll taxes or subsidies may be not much less impractical 
than lump-sum transfers. Nor are they likely to be desirable even if they can 
actually be put into effect.
Really, the policy measure to be used in measuring welfare should be one that 




























































































experiences a windfall gain or loss of some kind. Changes in the rate of income tax­
ation seem much more plausible, but would not generate money metric measures. 
A general alternative which would be a monetary measure could be constructed 
as follows: first specify a policy rule which determines, as a function of the size of 
any sudden windfall gain or loss, what tax and other policy changes it is believed 
that the government would want to carry out in response to a gain or loss of that 
magnitude. Also specify a reference situation which is believed to be what will 
happen in the event of a gain or loss of zero. Then, given the level of social welfare 
in any other situation, find the size of that gain or loss to which the government’s 
policy response would generate exactly the same level of social welfare. This is 
a much broader class of money metric measures of social welfare than the very 
specific uniform measure considered here. For the latter presumes, in effect, that 
the government will distribute any gain through a uniform poll subsidy, and meet 
any loss with the revenue from a uniform poll tax.
4.3. Time and Uncertainty
At first it may appear that this paper has considered exclusively static models 
of the economy and the environment. If true, this would obviously be a very serious 
limitation, especially as environmental damage is often very long-lasting. Yet in 
fact the same ideas could fairly easily be adapted to intertemporal models as well 
—  cf. the discussion in Hammond (1990b) of economies with dated contingent 
commodities and consumers, and the resulting dated contingent money metric 





























































































Like my other work in this area, this paper has been purely theoretical. As 
argued in Hammond (1990a), before making the compromises which are necessary 
because data are often very limited or unreliable, I think it is important to un­
derstand just how welfare could be measured in an ideal situation with unlimited 
data. Accordingly this paper presumes unlimited knowledge of all individuals’ de­
mand, supply and willingness to pay functions. In order to find the welfare effect 
of any actual policy change, moreover, it presumes that the resulting comparative 
static effects upon the prices and quantities which affect consumers are also all 
known with certainty. It must be admitted that there is an enormous gulf be­
tween this extreme hypothesis and what is actually known about real economies. 
Much work still remains to be done even on the theory of estimating welfare mea­
sures which are based on the kind of highly imperfect data which are all that 
applied economists usually have available. This paper has tried to set out the 
kind of measure which applied economists are likely to find themselves wanting to 
estimate.
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